ITALY AND THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE OF 1923
MARIA ANTONIA DI CASOLA Recent Italian historical studies concur in saying that one cannot talk of "Fascist" foreign policy before the end of the tvventies. It is true that Fascism came to power in October 1922. But until 1929 Italian foreign policy was decidedly subordinated in Mussolini's strategy to domestic and financial considerations.
1 There were two kinds of reasons: a subjective one which aimed to see Fascism grow stronger at home; and an objective one, which concerned the stagnation of the international scene not allowing much flexibility avvay from the mainly traditional foreign policy Mussolini had to follow in this period. It is also true that, at the very beginning, Mussolini was thought to have considered Fascism as a legitimizing ideology for his foreign policy. 2 A change in this situation occurred, on account of the great economic crisis (1929) . A more dynamic foreign policy was needed to bolster economic policies aiming at new markets for Italy in the Danubian-Balkan region. This is why although the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, falls into the Fascist era, one cannot think of it as revealing a precisely Fascist foreign policy. Italian action in Lausanne should be interpreted as reflecting a number of "traditional" interests, essentially aimed to safeguard the rights of Italy on the "Dodecanneso".
In a wider context, "winner in war, but defeated in peace", Italy found herself trying to cope with an uneasy dilemma: she had to lessen French negotiating power so as to press once more for those compensations she had not obtained at the Paris Peace Conference. It was for this reason that she would soon need Germany's support on the continental scene to face France. On the other hand, Italy also realized that an exaggerated recovery of Germany would have been dangerous. Moreover, Britain's hostility would not have been an easy obstacle to overcome. It was through the efforts of Ambassador Contarini, the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the foreign policy of the new Fascist government was based on new foundations. 3 In the days of the Lausanne Convention the main inconsistency in Italian foreign relations following the end of the First World War was the development of a double-edged policy, based on her two traditional chessboards, the continental and maritime ones, in swinging movements from one to the other. But time stili had to pass before one could observe the so-called "grandiose" policy. Mussolini had talked about on the eve of his actions and again during his initial speeches in the Parliament as the new Prime Minister. 4 Yet a great many of those who formulated or applied Italian diplomacy, at least the ones involved in the "Eastern question", vvaited a more trenchant action able to overcome that "renouncer panic" which had "stricken our diplomacy during the unhappy year of 1920."
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And when Mussolini attended the first part of the Lausanne Conference (with the precise intention of gaining back for Italy the prestige the Allies had denied her 6 ), many were the favourable appraisals ascribed to his presence and personal performance tovvards the satisfactory solution for Italy of the Dodecanese question. 
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The basis of the Italian position pursued at the Conference of Lausanne had already been laid down before Fascism had come to power: mere chance had a lot to do with it.
In fact, in March 1922, during Luigi Facta's last Cabinet, Schanzer had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was entrusted with the task on his way from the United States. He had to go directly to the Conference called in Paris in order to discuss the new peace conditions to be imposed to Turkey. As Guariglia reminds 13 us, Schanzer had had no time to get even a rough idea about the issues to be dealt with. When faced with Lord Curzon's precise request about the Italian position, it was the diplomatist who accompanied him, the young Guariglia who drew on a small map a border line more favourable to Turkey than the one proposed a moment before by the French. Those which later became the border lines "supported by the Italian Government" had been drawn on the spot by an official aware that, in the light of the situation which had been created in the Balkans, the Italian interest was to expand nevv Turkey's borders in Europe, as much as possible. Essentially upset because of Italy's pro-Turkish policy, the British Foreign Office supported again the argument that the Dodecanese was an issue concerning the Allies as a whole, and not exclusively Italy and Greece which had signed the agreement. 18 On the other hand, during the meetings between the Allied Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which had taken place in London and in Paris in previous June and July, it seemed to Rome that the British Government had accepted the Italian point of view according to which the issue of the occupied isles constituted a problem between Italy and Greece to be solved betvveen them. 19 Expressing the wish to get along with the British Government and abiding by Contarini's principle that what is useful for Italy, even in the British note, may well be accepted 20 , the Italian document emphasized that peace with Turkey formed a whole, with relative advantages and disadvantages for the various parties and that Italy "was willing to undertake proportionally ali sacrifices that would be accepted by her allies". The Italian presence in the Dodecanese was not to be ascribed to "fortuitous circumstances". At the outbreak of the First World War, Italy possessed these isles in accordance with the Treaty of Ouchy which had put an end to the Italian-Turkish war accomplishments in the war, and by Turkey's position. 21 As to the following agreement, signed by Ambassador Bonin-Longare with Prime Minister Venizelos, by which Italy undertook to give the Dodecanese back to Greece, it was to be considered among "the conciliatory elements" brought in by the common effort of the Allies with the aim to ensure, by means of the Treaty of Sevres and the Tripartite Agreement, a lasting peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Under the Sevres settlement, Italy would have no problem in executing the Bonin-Venizelos agreement, but it was clear that the latest events in Anatolia i.e., the Kemâlist victory and the evacuation of izmir by the Greeks, eliminated the possibility of attaining peace short of a wide revision of the desired situation. The Italian Government, therefore, perfectly agreeing that the issue of the Dodecanese was part of the general settlement of the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the Treaty of Sevres and the Tripartite Agreement, could not accept the "obligatory" nature of the BoninVenizelos agreement in case the other two agreements failed to be enforced as they had been conceived. Italy was, thus, willing to re-examine with the Allies the agreement envisaged in August 1920 on the whole, in order to reach a new settlement. In fact, already on 8 October 1922 Foreign Minister Schanzer had communicated to Metaxas, the Greek Minister in Rome, that Italy held as destitute the special agreements with Greece about the Dodecanese. 22 Among the instructions relative to this question given the Italian Embassies in London and Paris, in order to inform those governments 23 , he had insisted that they should emphasize the further diffıculties Italy would encounter with Ankara which would not accept the Dodecanese being given back to Greece and would refuse at the peace conference their transfer to Italy while an agreement avvarding them to Greece existed.
By denouncing the Bonin-Venizelos agreement it was possible to prevent Turkey from claiming the Dodecanese and therefore, Turkish sovereignty över the Greek populations of the islands. 24 This was the opinion of De Bosdari, the governor of Rhodes, who, from the very beginning of his mission (August 1922), was very much against "making a present of the isles to Greece", this being an engagement he held as the consequence of an "ill-omened policy such as Venizelosism" envisaged by 21 France and Britain to the detriment of Italy and of which the Greek people themselves had benefitted. 25 So, both on the ground of an accurate juridical analysis and because of a renewed nationalistic vigour, Italy vvas ready to claim her rights on the Dodecanese, rights she demanded to be devoid of conditioning.
# # •
Among the three counterparts at the Conference, i.e. the Allies, Greece and Turkey, relations vvith the last-mentioned seemed more promising since the very beginning. Already in Paris, İsmet Pasha had expressed the hope that the Italian delegation vvould have a favourable attitude tovvards Turkey and also let it be knovvn that Turkey vvould vievv vvith goodvvill Italy's special interests. 26 Except the economic agreements, aknovvledged by the istanbul Government, but not yet by the Kemâlists, vvho scrutinized Admiral Chester's American plans, 27 Italian interests vvere mainly represented by the definitive assignment of the Dodecanese. Rome's position vvas to be satisfied vvith the simple transfer of Article 115 of the Treaty of Sevres (vvhich had already assigned the isles to Italy), and avoid elevating the question to a political level, and if this could not be done, to be content vvith the draft of the nevv treaty. In fact, there vvas some co-operation betvveen the delegations of Ankara and Rome in this respect.
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At the non-governmental level, the nationalist press in Italy insisted upon the fact that the Turkish National Pact did not seem to claim for the Dodecanese. It is true that in the agenda the Kemâlists intended to discuss in Lausanne, there vvas the issue of the isles off the Anatolian coast, along vvith the Dodecanese. 29 But no one imagined that the Turkish nationalist government vvould pursue a different path from the one they had chosen at Sevres. 30 socialists who thought it wise to make ethnical reasons prevail and declared that the islands be transferred to Greece on this basis.
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As to İsmet Pasha, correct and rigorous executor of Mustafa Kemâl's policies, who, in those same days was starling to get engaged in the revolutionary changes of his country, he had made it clear from the very beginning that the isles, in no case, could be transferred to Greece. For the rest, during the long negotiations between victorious Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece and Britain on the other, good relations betvveen these delegations developed.
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The Italian national press ascribed this tendency to the simultaneous presence in both countries of new strong governments. 33 It was apparent that there vvould no be particular objections by the Turks to assign the Dodecanese to Italy.
Differences of opinion vvith the Turks centered mainly on the island of Castellorizo, then knovvn as Castelrosso, 33 * 5 It vvas a tiny island, very close to the Turkish coast vvhich the Treaty of Sevres had assigned to Italy. Turkey novv vvanted to keep it for itself for strategic purposes. But on the other hand, the Italian delegation vvas to obtain Castellorizo at any cost, since the nevv fascist government could not afford to lose vvhat the previous "renouncer" governments had already managed to acquire. The Castelrosso issue abruptly came up when, on 8 March 1923, Turkey delivered a note concerning its future status. 35 One month earlier, the Lausanne negotiations had been broken down mainly on account of economic and financial issues. The note included the complete drafts of the treaty and of conventions delivered to the Turks in Lausanne on 31 January 36 plus the changes now proposed by Ankara. The most surprising change concerned Italy because while allowing the Dodecanese cession, Article 15 stated that Castellorizo had to remain Turkish. Public opinion in Turkey, it was said, could not accept an Italian possession just opposite the Turkish coast of Adalia (Antalya), where the obsolute Treaty of Sevres and the Tripartite Agreement had agreed to an Italian sphere of influence. 37 The Italian representative, stili in Lausanne, immediately expressed "the vivid surprise and resentment caused by the Turkish claim", which was quite unexpected in the absence of any hint in the previous notes. Besides Italy's friendly behaviour should have entitled that country to a very different consideration. 38 Rome was then informed by Mustafa Şerif that the request came from the Grand National Assembly in Ankara whilst ismet Pasha was against it. Was it plausible or was it just a negotiations technique? Probably the latter because it was being suggested that Turkey could drop its claim on Castellorizo if Italy engaged in due course not to hand över the Dodecanese to Greece. 39 It was on this ground that London, realizing potential Italian help on the Straits question and the way it could strengthen her own position, promised to back Italy's point of view on Castellorizo 40 and disallow any further discussion on territorial disputes. On the other hand, London was to accept Turkey's claims about Tenedos and the Maritsa border. A conflict between Italy and Britain thus strictly related to the one between Italy and Greece, was thus to come to a close.
London had been backing Greek requests on the Aegean islands since the very end of the First World War. Lloyd George had guaranteed British [. support since December 1918, 41 when Venizelos had clearly asked the Peace Conference for ali the Aegean islands including Rhodes and the whole Dodecanese. 42 Doing so the Greek Prime Minister confronted Italy with a moral question based on Wilsonian ethnic principles than with a legal one which the Italian position, stemming from the London Pact (1915) considered to be irreproachable. Actually, the Greek statesman had already secured support, the latter having based his approach on self-determination, and not on the London Pact. 43 It was mainly because of bad relations with the Allies of the Entente and the pressures exerted by them that Italy's "ill-omened" Nitti cabinet, had signed, in July 1919, the Greek-Italian agreement, known by the names of the negotiators, Titoni and Venizelos. It gave up the whole former policy on the Aegean islands, pursued for years from di San Giuliano until Sonnino, the new agreement stating this time that Italy would tranfer "to Greece the sovereignty of the islands she occupies in the Aegean Sea" except Rhodes and Castellorizo where a wide autonomy would be granted.
Notwithstanding the mild reservation of Article 7 (in case Italy was not satisfied in Asia Minör, she was free with respect to ali points of the present agreement) and the additional Protocol pledging a plebiscite in Rhodes, the very day England decided to give Cyprus up to Greece, 44 nationalist Italian quarters condemned Italian foreign policy as "a mere catastrophe" not concealing the regret for the Triple Alliance which had better guaranted Italian Mediterranean interests.
When a new situation was created with Italian recognition of Albania's independence, Sforza (now Minister of Foreign Affairs in the nevv Giolitti Cabinet) denounced the agreement in July 1920 46 soon after replacing it with the Bonin-Venizelos Agreement of 10 August 1920 which simply modifıed the Rhodes regime. Italian public opinion did not delay exhibiting its dissent against this agreement too; most of the press asked for a "tout court" occupation of the islands which the Treaty of Sövres had definitely given to Italy, Castellorizo included. 47 On 11 March 1921 (the ratification of the Treaty of Sövres having been delayed) Italy received Castellorizo directly from France which had occupied it (not because of sovereignty but because of the iure belli terms of the armistice with Turkey.) At the same time, the nevv Bononi Cabinet, vvith Della Torretta at the foreign offıce (/a Consulta), promising a vvide autonomy for both the islands, reaffirmed that vvith the revision of the Treaty of Sevres, Italy vvould be also free from the consequent commitments vvith Greece, thus giving rise to nevv complaints among the friends of Greece. 48 Novv, in Lausanne, vvhere Italy vvanted to curb and repress "Greek megalomania", the Turkish note of 8 March 1923, vvhile confirming the intent to transfer to Italy the Dodecanese, brought up once more the fate of Castellorizo.
Was the demonstration, vvhich had broken out on the islands on 13 April, and during vvhich the people demanded to be left under Italian sovereignty, a spontaneous one? 49 Actually, the discussion on Castellorizo opened in Lausanne on 25 April 1923 vvhen Sir H. Rumbold rejected the Turkish request on the basis of tvvo arguments: a change of sovereignty meant an unacceptable change of the initial Draft, and Castellorizo's Greek-Orthodox population did not allovv the island to be part of the Turkish National Pact.
During the sharp discussion betvveen İsmet Paşa and the Italian delegation vvhich ensued, the Italians backed the point that Ankara had already accepted to give the islands (in a letter dated 4 February 50 whilst Turkey kept standing on her ground on the basis of meticulous analysis of the Ouchy Peace (1912) and Article 1 of the National Pact.
Thankful for the help received from Rome in the last insidious dispute with Greece and pleased for Allied resolution to renounce the reparations (which Italian first delegate Montagna confidentially conveyed him as "a serious sacrifice for Italy"), îsmet Paşa pledged himself to withdraw his reservation on Castellorizo, as Italy withdrew that on the Ottoman Debt share relative to the Dodecanese. 51 An exchange of letters follovved betvveen the tvvo chiefs of the delegations vvhich definitely settled the matter of Castellorizo vvith a bilatcral agreement, separate from the Treaty of Lausanne, although approved by the Political Committee of the Conference. Montagna informed Rome as follovvs: "With the aknovvledgement of our sovereignty on Castellorizo vve have by novv favourably defined in the best possible vvay ali the questions of predominant Italian interest before the Conference." 52 In his speeches delivered in Milano (4 October) and again at the opening of the Parliament (11 October), Mussolini arrogated the success to himself. He vvas given credit for keeping London at bay for her deliberate vvill to affect Italian action in the Dodecanese, linking the question up to the end, to the Giubaland one: i.e. to those Italian "colonial" claims the independence of vvhich from the "eastern" ones had been stated since the Pact of London. 53 Actually, the colonial puzzle dragged itself for stili another year. The suspicions vvere not entirely removed about London's plan to bring Italy back to renevv the Bonin-Venizelos Agreement vvhich vvould finally let Greece have the Dodecanese. On the basis of a not perfectly clear clause (Article 16) of the nevv Treaty of Lausanne, Greece hopcd to settle the fate of the islands together vvith Italy, both being interested parties. 54 The atmosphere created by Tellini's assassination in Albania (23 August) and the subsequent "Corfu incident" did not make the situation any better betvveen the tvvo countries. It also got rid of the international bevvilderments on the real nature of the Italian strong man. "Fascism vvas throwing off its mask." 55 Mussolini's showdown looked to the English, whom the Duce thought to have fooled, "an extention to the foreign policy of the method adopted at home." 56 Moreover, how much of Mussolini's ambitious programme had crushed on the way of Lausanne negotiations when one thinks of Duce's early will to put the mandates up for discussion so as Italy too could at last be worthily revvarded? 57 The ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, which took place in Italy on 6 August 1924 (when the Giubanland question was över) launched Italy into the "Mediterranean dream" when the governorship of Mario Lago and later, that of Cesare Maria De Vecchi di Val Cismon aimed to "fascistizzare" (turn into Fascist style) the "latinity" of Rhodes. (Actually, the Turkish people of the island were often pleased with it, as on the occasion when the mufti of Rhodes advised his fellovv-citizens in a manifesto not to migrate to Turkey (as the Treaty of Lausanne allovved them to do) because many were the advantages granted by Italy, first of ali the release from serving in the army. 58 In fact, the way the negotiations were conducted in Lausanne, so favourable to Italy and the conciliatory nature of the Italian delegation's action, together with the gratitude of such a personality as îsmet Paşa, raised the hope of exploiting "other fields" with particular advantages to be achieved with Turkey. 59 Unfortunately, in the subsequent years, Turkish occupation of some minör islands and recurring rumours about Italian military fortification on Rhodes, caused fears, not only removing prospects of cooperation in economic and financial fields, but also posing dangerous aggressive ambitions.
Besides, benevolent Turkish attitude towards Italy was also the reason why Great Britain changed her position towards Italian foreign policy, as London looked for Italian help in the important question of the Straits which she could then arrange so as to achieve a privileged standing in the Mediterranean. Italy, on the other hand, binded as she was to the Dodecanese
